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Tuesday, March 17, 2026

The Real "Nuclear Option" In Persian Gulf War Isn't In Trump's Or Israel's Hands

 Could a GCC energy embargo halt the US-Israel war on Iran?

The GCC possesses a radical, unconventional, and highly effective tool to force an end to the hostilities; a collective and complete halt of all oil and gas exports

 
 
Smoke rises following a strike on the Bapco Oil Refinery, amid the US-Israeli war on Iran, on Sitra Island Bahrain on 9 March, 2026 (Reuters)

The US-Israel war on Iran has rapidly deteriorated into a regional crisis, dragging the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states into a war they did not seek.

As the fighting intensifies, the GCC countries - Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman - find themselves caught in the crossfire. With Israel pushing the United States into the conflict and Iran adopting a strategy of attrition, the Gulf states are bearing the brunt of the economic and security fallout.

In this precarious situation, traditional diplomacy and defensive measures are proving insufficient. However, the GCC possesses a radical, unconventional, and highly effective tool to force an end to the hostilities: a collective and complete halt of all oil and gas exports under force majeure situation.

The current dynamics of the war offer no incentives for the primary belligerents to cease fighting. For Israel, the costs remain minimal, as the United States shoulders the heavy lifting of military operations.

Meanwhile, Iran is committed to a prolonged war of attrition, aiming to weaken its adversaries through sustained pressure rather than decisive military victories.

Severe consequences

The GCC states are already paying a heavy price. Iranian drones and missiles have struck vital energy sites across the region. In Qatar, attacks on the Ras Laffan LNG complex - the world's largest - forced a halt in production and a declaration of force majeure on shipments.

Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura refinery, with a capacity exceeding 500,000 barrels per day, faced precautionary closures following drone interceptions. Similar incidents have occurred at the UAE's Fujairah oil field and Kuwait's Ahmadi refinery.

Furthermore, attacks on tankers near the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted a chokepoint that handles approximately 20 percent of global oil and gas shipments.

These attacks have immediate and severe economic consequences. Brent crude prices have surged, and natural gas prices in Europe spiked by over 54 percent following Qatar's LNG halt. Global stock markets have tumbled, and fears of sustained disruptions are raising inflation risks worldwide.

For the GCC, the pressure is dual; they must either absorb these mounting losses through heightened security measures and economic strain, or retaliate and risk deeper direct pro-active involvement in the war, which would be framed by Israel as joining the US-Israel coalition.

Both paths plunge the region into chaos, drain resources, and increase defence costs without offering any clear benefits.

The Gulf countries have thus far acted with high responsibility, striving to absorb and contain the war's repercussions. However, their defensive capabilities are not unlimited.

Mediation efforts are unlikely to succeed, as US calculations remain primarily tied to Israel's interests rather than those of the GCC

The financial costs of maintaining high alert and intercepting incoming threats are increasing daily. Defensive interception missiles cannot withstand cheap and unlimited attacks from the Iranian side for extended periods.

If stocks of defensive missiles run out, replenishing them will be difficult, costly, and unsustainable.

At that point, the options available to GCC countries will be exceedingly challenging as they become extremely vulnerable to the escalation of the war.

They will face enormous financial and economic losses, including increased targeting of vital economic infrastructure, the departure of foreign labour, and the inability to secure basic necessities amid a prolonged war.

Mediation efforts are unlikely to succeed, as US calculations remain primarily tied to Israel's interests rather than those of the GCC.

The radical solution

Given the bleak outlook and the exhaustion of traditional options, a unified GCC decision to cease all oil and gas exports until the war ends emerges as a rational, albeit radical, measure under force majeure situation.

This would not be an act of aggression, but a defensive manoeuvre to protect vital assets under threat, and force a resolution to a conflict that is destroying regional stability.

The GCC produces about 20 percent of global oil and a significant share of the world's liquefied natural gas (LNG).

A collective halt would create a global economic shock, instantly shifting the balance of power and giving the GCC countries the initiative. They would transform from victims dragged into a war by force of circumstance into decisive actors determining its fate.

A total suspension of GCC energy exports would compel the United States, Israel, and Iran to immediately reassess their positions.

The resulting energy shortages would likely trigger global pressure, fuelling massive public backlash in the West. The shock of the closure would elevate the grievances of the American public, pressuring the US administration to shift its focus from Israel's interests to domestic economic survival.

For Iran, whose economy is already strained by sanctions, export disruptions and war, the added pressure of a global economic crisis and the potential loss of any remaining revenue streams could force concessions. The US and Israel, facing severe domestic economic fallout, would be pushed toward negotiations.

Reclaiming control 

The GCC has a clear and compelling justification for such an action. Their facilities are being targeted slowly and painfully without provocation. They are being dragged into the war by the US and Israel, paying more for defence and security while enduring Iranian attacks. The bloc has the right to safeguard its sovereignty and protect its infrastructure.

While the costs of an embargo would be enormous for the Gulf countries, they are already incurring massive costs, while lacking control over the war's course.

As long as the primary belligerents face minimal costs or pursue strategies of attrition, the conflict will continue to drain Gulf resources and destabilise the region

Ultimately, they may be forced to stop the flow of oil and gas anyway due to direct targeting or threats from the conflicting parties. By taking the initiative, the GCC can control the timing and narrative of the shutdown.

Furthermore, the GCC states possess substantial financial buffers. Their sovereign wealth funds, holding trillions of dollars, could absorb short-term revenue losses.

Swift steps to secure liquidity through the sale of assets or future investments prior to the embargo would help mitigate the initial shock. Additionally, the higher prices resulting from scarcity might offset reduced volumes once exports resume.

As long as the primary belligerents face minimal costs or pursue strategies of attrition, the conflict will continue to drain Gulf resources and destabilise the region.

In this dire context, a collective decision by the GCC to halt all oil and gas exports stands as the single most powerful, non-military measure available to end the war.

By leveraging their unparallelled position in global energy markets, the GCC countries can force the international community to intervene and compel the warring parties to the negotiating table.

While the decision carries significant risks and costs, it offers the GCC a chance to reclaim control over their destiny, shifting from passive victims to the architects of regional peace.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

 
Ali Bakir is a research assistant professor at Ibn Khaldun Center for Humanities and Social Sciences. He is following geopolitical and security trends in the Middle East, great power politics, small states' behaviour, emerging unconventional risks and threats, with a special focus on Turkey’s foreign and defence policies, Turkey-Arab and Turkey-Gulf relations. He tweets @AliBakeer

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